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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE RIGHT OF AIR FLIGHT
By
JOHN A. EUBANK*
Just as definitely that surface owners have the exclusive right and possess own-
ership in the airspace above their surface areas necessary to the reasonable use and
enjoyment of the surface and the airspace above within the zone of effective pos-
session,' so does aircraft have the right of flight in the airspace above private prop-
erty provided such aerial navigation does not interfere with the existing use and
enjoyment of the surface and the airspace above by subjacent owners or unless
such flight is imminently dangerous to persons and property on the surface; and
of course aerial navigation must be above minimum safe altitudes of flight as pro-
vided by federal and state laws and regulations in the proper exercise of police
powers, inherent or delegated.
Article 3 of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics in declaring that own-
ership of airspace is invested in the several owners of the surface beneath, makes
the important proviso that such ownership is subject to the right of flight as de-
scribed in section 4, and the latter section reads in part as follows:
"Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this State is law-
ful, unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing
use to which the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is
put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous
to persons or property lawfully on the land or water beneath."
Twenty-one of the states of the Union have adopted the Uniform State Law
for Aeronautics in whole or in part, and all twenty-one have adopted section 4
declaring the lawfulness of flight. Other states have through legislation or court
decisions sanctioned the right of flight. Every state in the Union has in one form
or another given legal force to the concept of the right of flight. This has been
accomplished by expressed terms or by clear implication.
Section 5 of the Regulatory Act of the State of Nebraska declares that the
"air above the State of Nebraska is by this act declared to be here for the use and
operation of aircraft subject to such rules and regulations."
While the state law of Pennsylvania also has adopted the provisions of sec-
tion 4 of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics declaring the lawfulness of flight,
it also recognizes the right of flight in the following provisions of this state law:
"The ownership of the space over and above the lands and waters
of this Commonwealth is declared to be vested in the owner of the sur-
face beneath, but such ownership extends only so far as is necessary to
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the enjoyment of the use of the surface without interference, and is sub-
ject to the right of passage or flight of aircraft. Flight through the space
over and above land or water, at a suffici'ent height, and without inter-
ference to the enjoyment and use of the land or water beneath, is not an
actionable wrong, unless said flight results in actual damage to the land
or water, or property thereon or therein, or use of the land or water be-
neath."
2
Section 10 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 gave legal sanction to the right
of flight. The section authorizes the right of flight in making a declaration of navi-
gable airspace with relation to interstate and foreign air commerce as follows:
"As used in this Act, the term 'navigabl-e airspace' means airspace
above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary
of Commerce under section 3, and such navigable airspace shall be sub-
ject to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation
in conformity with the requirements of this Act."
Like section 10 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, section 3 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 provides for a public right of flight. The section states:
"There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any
citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit in air
commerce through the navigable air space of the United States."
Here again there is a recognition of the right of flight and a declaration ot
the right of aerial navigation in so far as inter-state and foreign air commerce is
concerned. Subdivision 24 of section 1 of the Civil Aeronautics Act also declares
that navigable airspace is any airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight pre-
scribed by regulations issued under the Act.
The Restatement of the Law of Torts regards aerial navigation over prop-
erty as a privilege rather than a right. In other words, in the view of the Restate-
ment, the operation of aircraft in the airspace over private property above mini-
mum safe altitudes as prescribed by governmental authorities and such operation
interfering in no way with the subjacent owners' rights, is a privilege of flight and
not a right of flight. Section 194 of the Restatement declares:
"Travel Through Air Space.
An entry above the surface of the earth, in the air space in the pos-
session of another, by a person who is traveling in an aircraft, is privileged
if the flight is conducted
(a) for the purpose of travel through the air space or for any other
legitimate purpose,
(b) in a reasonable manner,
(c) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably with the pos-
sessor's enjoym'ent of the surface of the earth and the air
space above it, and
(d) in conformity with such regulations of the State and federal
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In Tentative Draft No. 1, "Law Of Airflight", the American Law Institute
provides in Section 2 thereof as follows:
"Lawfulness of Flight. Flight of aircraft in this state is lawful:
(a) If in compliance with the laws of this state regulating aero-
nautics and, as far as applicable, with such laws of the United States; and
(b) If at a height permitted by the rules, regulations or orders
adopted and promulgated by the state (Aeronautical Commission), and
the applicable rules of the Department of Commerce of the United States;
and
(c) Unless so conducted as to involve a substantial risk of harm
to individuals or property on the land; or
(d) Unless so conducted as to constitute a substantial interference
with the then existing use and enjoyment of the land or structures on the
land or space over the land or adversely affect the then existing value of
the land and structures thereon."
A reading of this section 2 readily discloses that flight is given legal sanction
when conducted with due regard to surface owners' rights, safety of persons and
property on the stirface and in compliance with government regulations in gen-
eral and as to minimum altitudes of flight.
The constitutionality of section 4 of the Uniform State Law For Aeronautics,
of section 10 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and of section 3 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 had been challenged on the ground that in authorizing flight
in the airspace over private property, subjacent owners have been deprived of their
property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution as to the states enactments of section 4 and the like,
and the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as to sections 10 and 3 afore-
said. Some years ago a committee on aviation of the American Bar Association, in
this connection made the following pronouncement:
"We feel that this committee can do more beneficial service to the
public and the common interest of all the people than to challenge the
proposition that it is an invasion of the rights of private ownership of
property to utilize the air for purposes of flight."
In Smith v. New England Aircraft Company,' it was declared that these
statutes and regulations recognize the existence of navigation of the air as an es-
tablished condition, that they do not create such navigation, that they do not author-
ize the taking of private rights to promote such navigation, and the assumption
underlies their terms that navigation of the air exists. Continuing the court said
that the Act of Congress and the statutes of Massachusetts by plain impliction
if not by expressed terms, not only recognize the existence of air navigation but
authorize the flying of aircraft over privately owned land. It was also stated in the
decision that it is the proper function of the legislative department of government
in the exercise of the police power to consider the problems and risks that arise
from the use of new inventions and endeavor to adjust private rights and harmo-
8 270 Mass. 511 (1930).
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nize conflicting interests by comprehensive statutes for the public welfare. The
court also made the following pronouncement:
"The Court takes judicial notice of facts of common knowledge
concerning navigation of the air. In the present state of the art it is im-
possible to confine flight to the space over existing public ways. Aircraft
and navigation of the air have become of great importance to the land
and naval forces of the United States, in the carrying of mails, in forest
preservation and fire prevention, and in commerce as a means of transpor-
tation of persons and commodities. Statutes touching subjects of this
nature have been enacted by Congress and by the Legislatures of many
of the States. Aerial navigation has been regulated to a greater or less ex-
tent by foreign governments. It has been widely discussed in relation to
the municipal law and the law of persons and property of our own coun-
try, and to international law."
Naturally there is much judicial support for the right of flight.4 "Practical
air navigation is now an accomplished fact", stated the decision in Johnson v. Cur-
tiss Northwest Airplane Company.61n this case the court further declared:
"The upper air is a natural heritage common to all of the people,
and its reasonable use ought not to be hampered by an ancient artificial
maxim of law such as is here invoked. To apply the rule as contended
for would render lawful air navigation impossible, because if the
plaintiff may prevent flights over his land, then every other land own-
er can do the same."
Aviation has become an important, if not an indispensable public utility.6 In
the state of New York the right of flight above minimum prescribed height is de-
dared by the laws of 1928, chapter 233.7 The privilege or right of airplanes to fly
through the airspace is recognized by the common law and in the statutory law
of Michigan. s
Navigation of the airspace is an absolute existing right. The right of flight
is an inherent natural right. Aerial navigation is univerally recognized and prac-
ticed.9 Its very existence is for the general enrichment of mankind and the develop-
ment and advancement of civilization. As stated by the late Justice Rugg in Smith
v. New England Aircraft Co.,' 0 the United States Congress and the statutes of
Massachusetts by plain implication, if not by expressed terms, recognize the exis-
tence of aerial navigation. Moreover aerial navigation is part of our technological
age.
Recent affirmation has been given to the principle of the right of flight
through legislative action by a number of states in 1943. Minnesota reenacted sec-
4 Eubank, John A., "Adjudication of Rights In Airspace By Judicial Process", Marq. L. Rev.,
September 1947.
5 1928 U.S. Av. R. 42.
6 Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817. (1934).
7 See also Sysak v. DeLisser, 1931 U.S. Av. R. 7.
8 Guith et al. v. Consumers Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (1940).
9 Eubank, John A., "What About The Airspace?", Can. B. Rev. February 1930. See All-
American Airways v. Cedarhurst, U.S.C.C.A. 2nd Cir. Jan. 7, 1953.
10 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
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tion 4 of the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, declaring the right of flight.1
It is declared that the use of the space for the operation of aircraft in the transpor-
tation of persons and/or property is affected with the public interest and that such
use should be effectively regulated in all its phases relating to the public inter-
est. 12 In no case shall damages or compensation be awarded for the usual and cus-
tomary use by aircraft of the area above land or structures. 18 A civil airway is a
route in the navigable airspace over or above the territory or waters of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania designated by the Pennsylvania Aeronautics Commis-
sion as a route for intrastate and interstate commerce. 14
Asserting the right of flight and the control and regulation thereof, it was
stated by the district court in Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation15 as follows:
"No constitutional or legislative provisions or statutes have hereto-
fore established any exclusive proprietary rights in a landowner to the
superincumbent air space normally traversed by the aviator. Constitu-
tional provisions guaranteeing the right of property do not, in our opin-
ion, forbid legislation which has for its purpose the regulation and ad-
justment of the conflicting rights and interests of the landowner and
the public. Any regulatory legislation, not unreasonable or arbitrary
and not abridging unreasonably a landowner's rights of effective posses-
sion, would be constitutional, it seems to us, as against the constitutional
guarantees protecting property.
"Here the right of aviation necessary in times of peace, and for ade-
quate defense in time of war, is involved, and the absolute ownership
of private property may to some extent be limited and curtailed in a great
public interest. It might justly be limited even for a seemingly private
use, for 'it is established by a series of cases that an ulterior public ad-
vantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking of private prop-
erty for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private use.' (Mr. Justice
Holmes, in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 106."
As Mr. Justice Jackson in the case of Northwest Air Lines v. Minnesota ana
Ramsey Countyx 6 in a statement of obiter dictum declared:
"Aviation has added a new dimension to travel and to air ideas.
The ancient idea that landlordism and sovereignty extended from the
center of the world to the periphery of the universe has been modified.
Today the landowner no more possesses a vertical control over all the
air above him than a shore owner possesses horizontal control of all the
sea above him. The air is too precious as an open highway to permit it to
be 'owned' to the exclusion or embarrassment of air navigation by sur-
face landlords who could put it to little real use."
11 Section 20, subdivision 3, chapter 653, Minnesota Laws of 1943.
12 Section 2, No. 248, 1943 Laws of Alabama.
13 S.B. No. 138, section 9, 1943 Laws of Oklahoma.
14 Act of 1943, P.L. 201, § 102(i).
15 41 F.2d 929 (1930).
16 322 U.S. 292 (1943).
